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1　In㍍0duCtiOn
　　　　The　standard　economic　model　of　consumers’choice　for　personal
bankruptcy　has　been　forma1ized　with　a　two－period　Fisherian　consump－
tion　model（for　examp1e，see　Jaffee＆Russe11（1976），Kowalew・ski（ユ982），
White（1987／88））．This　standard　model　can　be　extended　into　an　infinite
horizon　dynamic　mode1of　optima1consu・mption　p1an　（for　exam」ple，
models　known　as1三fe　cyc1e　or　permanent　income　hypothesis（B工anchard
＆F＝scher（1989）chapters2＆5，Brito＆Hart1ey（1995））．
　　　　The　standard　model　i1皿pIies　that，when　persona1bankruptcy　with
the　right　of　discharge　of　debts　is　1ega1，　the　oPtima1　decision　for　a
rationa一，utility＿maxi肌izing　consumer　is　to　borrow　as㎜uch　as　possib1e
and　file　for　bankruptcy　so　long　as　the　net　economic　benefit　fro孤
b狐kruptcy　is　positive－White一（1987／88）characterizes　this　type　of
consumer　as　a　fu1ly　opPortunistic　individ・ua1，and　the　other　type　of
conslユmer　who　is　se1f－restrained　from　bankruptcy　as　an　extre㎜ely
。Thisis・・e軍tendeda皿dr・vlsedE㎎lishve・sio・⑪f㎜yi・1t1a1prese口t劃tlon・tthe
a皿nua1皿eeting⑰f　Tbe」罫P軋聰ese　Society　of　Mo皿etary　Eco皿o卿ics　in1996，　Financiaユ
support　fro凪Aミsociat訂o皿for　R」es聞rch　in　CΦ皿suI皿er　Fiη抑cia』Services（ARC§）is
gratefuuy　ack皿ow工edged，
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n．㎝一〇pport㎜1stic　individuaL　White　also　suggests　that　the　latter’s
non－opportunistic　beha▽ior，which　she　considers　as　norma1，comes仕om
his　religious　upbringing，social　pressure，ethics　or　even　genes．　Ho」珊一
ever，she　did　not　incorporate　theses　factors　into　her　formal　model．0n
the　co工1trary’，Jaffee　＆　Russel1　（1976，P，652）　characterize　the　non－
opPortunistic　consumers　as　‘’Patho1ogically”　honest　individuals，since
the　ful1y　opportunistic　consu．mers　h．ave　been　considered　as　normal
a9℃皿ts　in　　econo」m．ics，　in　　the　sense　that　they　　are　rationa1，　uti1ity－
maXimiZin9－
　　　　HoweYer，a1mos亡all　ccnsumer　sur▽eys　so　far　conducted　on　their
attitudes　toward　consulner　credit　or　credit　cards（avai1ability　of　instant
consumer　credit　in　general）reveal　c1ear－y　that血any　consumers　have
strong　ambiva1ent　feelings　regarding　the　use　of　consumer　credit　or
credit　cards（for　examp1e，Mandell（1972），」Ueda（1990），Tapan　Credit
Industry　Association（1993），to　name　just　a　few）一They　recognize　and
apPreciate　its　convenience　as　a　means　of　no　delayed，immediate　or
imminent　purchases，that　is，by　using　consumer　credit　or　credit　cards，
they　can　b1ユy　aI加cst　anything　whose　price　is　within　a　reasonable　range
withou．t　cash　at　the　very　moment　when　they　feel　an　necessity　or
impu1se　to　buy　it）．But，at　the　same　tiIne，they　feel　worried　about　their
own　tendency　to　use　consulner　credit　or　credit　cards　excessively．
Maoy　consumers　have　a　fear　of　tbe　possibility　that　the　avai1ability　of
instant　consumer　credit　or　credit　cards　may　induce　or　faci1itate
so－ca11ed　impu工se　buying　so　that　they　may　ha▽e土o　face　debt　repaymen亡
proble］エユs　or　financial　distress　inc1uding　Persona1　bankruptcy　in　the
future．One　of　the　surveys　even　shows　that　consumers（both　American
andJapan・・e）ad血itthattheyth・m・elv・・ar・r・spo・・ib1efo・bankmpt－
cy　as　we11as　creditors（see　White　paper　on　c㎝sumer　credit　in　Japan
（ユ993））一
　　　　The　standard　economic　model　is　c1eariy　inconsistent　with　these
survey　results　showing　consu．mers’ambivaIent　feeli皿gs　regardin．g　con一
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sum．er　credit（that　is，appreciation　of　its　convenience　on　the　one　hand，
and　anxiety，worry　or　fear　of　people’s　preva1ent　tendency　to　use　credit
excessiveIy　on　the　other）．　The　standard　econo1皿ic　modeユcan　not
exp1ain　these　consumers’attitudes．　Therefore，any　po1icy　suggestions
derived　from　the　standard　economic　model　can　be　InisIeading　and　even
aggravate　prob1ems　of　persona1bankruptcy．Any　plausib1e　modeユs　of
consumers’credit　behaviors　sbould　be　able　to　explain　these　prevalent
attitudes　of　consumers　toward　the　availabi1ity　of　instant　consumer
credit，or　at1east　must　be　consistent　with　them．
　　　　In　this　paper，we　focus　on　these　ambivalent　fee1ings　of　consumers
which　have　been　neglected　by　the　standar（1economic　mode1，and
assume　that　one　of　the　basic　and　crucial　causes　of　consu㎜er’s　bank－
ruptcy　is　peop1e’s　tendency　to　behave　time－inconsistently　（that　is，
impu1se　buying　or　immediate　and　unp1anned　purchases　on　credit　in　this
case）。We　propose　a　model　of　impu1se　buying　on　credit　by　usi㎎Hoch
＆Loewenstein’s　reference－point－shift　model（！991）、We　extend　this
mode1to　incorporate　the　consumers’ambiva1ent　feelings　toward　the
availabi1ity　of　instant　consumer　credit　or　credit　cards　by　introducing
some　type　of　uti1ity　cost　function　associated　with　impulse　buying．ユ
Using　this　mode一。we　proceed　to　discuss　some　po1icy　questions，such　as
whether　or　not　the　personal　bankruptcy1aw　should　be　app！ied　more
・t・i・tly（th・ti・，1…1・・i・・tly〕、・・1…f…diti・f・m・ti・…d・・p・・t
1　This　mode1皿1ay　be　apPIied　to　so．me　other　prob］ems　such　as　dieting，alcoholism．
smoking1Preparei皿9for　exam．s　and　so　on・For　example，consider　a　case　where　a　ph－D，
econ・stlldent　prePari皿9for　the　com皿g　c⑪re　or　pre11m」i皿ary　exaI皿s　has　made　rat1ona1ly
an　opti卿aI　study　p1a1l一’However，heエ皿ight　a皿t蛇ipate　that　be　wi1l　feel　an　i．mpulse　o王
・ヌtra・・d㎜p1・m・ddi・t・actio・du・i・ghls・…yi㎎th・o・ghhi・oPti．m・1pi酬・nd
sometimes　gives　m　to｛ls　tempt莚口g　impu1se，even　if　he　understands　fuuy　that　tbis
extra　dコstractio皿will　violate　his　optimal　study　plan　and　m」ay　jeopardi匡e　his　fin日1
ψ・ti…P・SSi・gth・・楓m干・O・・卿d・1・目・b・・pPli・dt⑪thi・ph．D。・t・d・・t1・
probl■e皿、
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network　systems，credit　education　and　so　on，in　order　to　curb　an
increasing　trend　of　personaI　bankruptcy　observed　in　the　USA．2
　　　　0ne　of　the　main　implications　of　our　model　is　that　making’the
bankruptcy　law皿ore　strict（or1ess　lenient）may　aggravate　personal
bankruptcy　prob1ems　in　the　long＿run，contrary　to　its　initia1aim－This
is　mainly　because　of　the　so－called　co馴iti▽e　dissonance　which　urges
peop1etose旧us亡ifyorself－rati㎝ali・etheircont・adictorybehavio・s．
This　policy　implication　could　be　opposed　to　the　one　suggested　by　the
standard血odel，that　is，more　strict　bankruptcy　law．
　　　　This　paper　has　sevenエnore　sections．Section2describes　the　main
characteristics　of　Hoch＆Loewenstein’s　reference＿point－shift　mode1，
Section3introduces　genera1ideas　of　our皿odel　of　consumers’impu1se
buying　behavior　and　their　uti1ity　function　of　impulse　purchases．
Section　4　discusses　the　main　characteristics　of　their　uti1ity　cost
fullction　in　detai1，　Section5sets　up　the　consumer’s　maximization
problem，derives　the　optimal　so1utions，and　discusses　some　characteris－
tics　of　the　solutions．　Section　6　briefly　discusses　creditors’behavior
focusing　on　the　determination　of　optimal　credit1ine．　Section7discuss－
es　some　p1ausib1e　and　rather1ong－range　policy　measures　to　curb
impu1se　buying　and　their　effecti▽eness．The　final　section　is　a　summary
and　conclusion．
2　The　bankruptcy　law　in　the　USA．has　been　deve1oped　to　provide　the＾honest　but
mfotmate　debtor｝with　a　fresh　start．Fro血the　stand　pomt　of　the　fresh－start　policy，
　red咀cing　the　number　of　personal　bankruptcies　itse1f1皿ay　not　necessarily　stand　for　an
且dequate　ob］ectiYe，In　this　paper，however，we　wiH　take　this　objective　for駆anted　for
the　present．See司1so　a　footnote（10）．Incidentany，m　the　world　of　Jaifee＆Russe11
　（ユ976）一there　hapPens　to　be口o山honest　but　unfortunate　debtor’’・
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2H㏄h＆・Loewensteiハ’s　R」eferen㏄一Poimt－Shift　Mode1
　　　（HLmode1）
　　　　Iエ1their　paper（199！），Hoch　and　Loewenstein　address　a　topic　of
how　and　why　cons皿mers　experience　sudden，often　powerful　u－ges　to
buy　somethi皿g　immediately．They　ca11these　urges　as　tim」e－inconsistent
preferences　and　present　a　reference　point（shift）model　of　desire　to
exp1ain　the皿．　The　core　notion　of　HL　mode1is　that“tiIne－inconsistent
preferences　are　due　to　sudden　increase　in　desire　brought　o．n　by　a　shift
in　the　consumer’s　reference　pcint（p．494）”．They　a1so　say　as　fo1／ows：
“After　a　reference　point　shifts，consumers　not　on1y　attach　positive一
FigUre1
〆（ぷ）
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utility　to　the　object　itself，but　they　aIso　attach　negati▽e　utility　to　faiIure
to　consume　the　object．　Fai1ure亡o　purchase　impiies　more　than　the
foregone　p1easure　fro血　co」nsumption：the　individual　actuauy　fee工s
depriv・d（P，494）．加
　　　　They　i11ustrate　the　effect　of　a　reference　point　shift　using　a
fra血ework　intrcduced　in．Kahne血an　an．d　Tversky’s　prospect　theory
（1979）and　Loewensteiエi’s　study　of　interte血pora1choice（ユ988）、　They
assume乱si血ple　linearマ’alue　fmction　shown　i．n　F…gureユ．This　value
function（for　examp1e，see　the　graph　γ｛n　the　diagram）s11ares亡wo
crucial　characterisモics　of　the　value　function　in　the　prospect　theory，
First　is　the　existence　of　reference　point　from　which　agents　eva1uate
・lt・m・ti…（th・ti・，thg・…i・…f・・1・・・…h・㎎・・（9・i…｛・…）
in　wea1th　or　we1fare　fro」m．some　reference　asset　position．rather　than
final　states）、The　original　point　O　is　the　reference　point　of　the　function
γ．
　　　　Second　is　the　existence　of　loss－aversion　re」Ωected　i」n　its　kink’ed
graph．　Loss＿aversion　indicates　the　basic　gai」n＿Ioss　asym」metry’that
people　tend　to　eva1uate　the　disuti1ity　of　gi▽ing　up　an　object　more　than
the　utility　of　acquiring　it．3　γis　the　original　YaIue　function　with　no
reference　point　shift（or，the　reference　point　being　the　original　point　O）．
狗　is　the　units　of　som．e　object　（9σods　or　ser∀ices）　which　can　be
norInalized　to！。　γis　a1inear　function　and　has七he　foncwing　for皿，
assu皿1ing　that∫is　a　reference　point：
　　　　　　γ（π）＝α（卜∫）　ヴκ≧’・
　　　　　　γ（沈）＝β（尤一∫）　　ゲ寛くふ
3　It　ls　said　that1oss＿averslon　could血o主be　seen　whe日peop1e　own　the　objects　only　for
虐伽tualresale．See．forexa血plゼ、Th盆1er（1992）．
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　　　　The　va1ue　of約to　a　ccnsu皿er　w・ith　no　reference　point　shift（8＝O）
is　珂絢）一・y（O）＝」γ（約）＝、α約，　After　a　reference　point　shift　t0　8in　the
di・g・am，th・・al・e・f勿tohi皿i・γ’（狗）一γ（O）＝α（約」一・）一β（O－
s）＝α物十（β一α）s．
Sinceβ＞α，he　now　va1ues狗more　by（β一α）8than　before　a　reference
point　shift　and　tends　to　purchase　if　instant　consumer　credit　or　credit
cards　are　avaiIable　at　that　very　moment，　In　other　words，when　the
reference　point　shifts，the　consu】］l1er　fee1s　strongly　the　possible　depriva－
tion　and　seeks　to　buy　or　ho1d出e　goods．This　creates　time＿inccnsistent
behavior　that　violates　the　origina1optiInal　p1an　he　made　before　witll」no
reference　point　shiftsI　This　purchasing　behavior　is　ca11ed　ti㎜e＿
inconsistent　behavior◎r　impulse　buying，4
　　　　Plausib1e　causes　of　reference　point　shift　re1y　upon　a　．notion　o｛
proxim」ity（physical，temporal，◎r　socia1）as　a　key　factor　to　induce
reference　point　shift，　For　exa卿P1e，the　visible　or　sensory　presence　of　a
reward　wi11make　waiting　more　difficult．This　is　the　case　of　physical
proximity．Tempora1prox…mity　means　that　the　i．m．mediate　availabi肚y
of　a　reward　wiu　ten」d　to　increase　disProPortionate工y　the　desire　for　it，
Sccia1proximity　implies　that　pecple　tend　to　compare　tbemselves　to
their　peers　and　try　to　c〇二nsume　or　possess　what　their　peers　do．5
　　　　In　the　fouowing　discussion，we　assume　this　type　of　uti1ity土unction
as　One　exPlaiI1ing　cOnsu」j皿er’s　extra　cr　te一皿pOraI　uti1ity　frOI皿　time－
inco皿si・tentbeh・・i・r（i．皿p・lseb・yi㎎），thati・，（β一α）・．（β一6）i・a
deg爬e　of1oss－awsi㎝」。We　also　assu皿e　that　i．nsta二n」t　cQ．n」su肌er　credit，
皿ot　cash，wiu　be　excユusively　Used　in　the　i肌Pulse　pu」rchases　aqd」that　the
availability　of　insta，nt　consu1卿er　credit　or　credit　cards　皿ユ」ay　lfaci1itate
r・f・・encepointsbifts，6
4Severヨlexperi皿1－entalresu1虜showth亘t1皿ge皿era1，．βrgughlyequalstp2α
TMer（ユ992，chapter6），
5Asfortheno虹⑪皿ofp・o茎i㎜ity一蝋、Hbc止＆Loewenst出（199！），PP吉496ヰ498．
Se 、
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3　Genera1Fmmework　of　Our　Mlode1
・3．1　Mode1・Setting（1）
　　　　Our血ode1settingsareasfouows．Atypicalco」nsumerisassumed
to　have　some　cri釦na1optima1consumption　plan　over　a　reasonab1y
finite　planning　horizon，」which　is　not　associated　with　any　reference
point　shifts．The“origina一｝plan　means　a　plan　which　was　ca1cu1ated
mder　no　reference　point　shi盆．This　ori貞na1optimal　p1an，therefore，
Inayごorrespond　to　the　usua1optimaI　consumption　plan　deri▽ed　fro皿
the　standard　dynamic　consumption　modeI　when　observing　or　not
▽io1ati㎎an　intertemporal　budget　constraint，Wh．en　a　consu」mer　makes
his　original　optimal　p1an　under　no　reference　point　shift，he　can　smooth
out　his　consumption　stream　by　uti1izing’borrowing　or　lending　opportu－
nities．　But，he　is　supposed　to　make　his　borrowing　p1an　under　the
condition　of　observing　his　intertempora1budget　constraint，so　that
there　wiu　be　no　serious　possibiIity　of　facing　deep　financia1troub1es　in
the　f1ユture　as1ong　as　his　origina1optima1p1an　is　concerned．　This
asslユmption　is　consistent　with　an　implication　of　the　consumers’sur▽ey
resu／ts　that，when　making　their　optima1consumption　plan，a1most　au
consu血ers　try　to　avoid　serious　financia1troub1es　in　the　futureゴ　This
optimal　plan　may　also　be　interpreted　more　broadly，such　as　a　long－run
optima1or　desirable1ife　plan　at　each　stage　in　a　consu血er’s　life　cycie．
Wth　this　original　optimal　life　p1an　in　mind，he　lives　his　e▽eryday1ife，
　　　　As　a　typical　example，we　can　take　a　stoch．astic　uti1ity　ma文imizatio正i
problem　forma1ized　in　the　section6of　Brito＆Hartley（1995）．In　their
pr■ob1em　setting，a　consumer　experiences　a　shock　of　desired　consump－
tion　at　each　period　defined1〕・y　an　uniform　distribution・　The　optima1
6　This　latter　assu皿ption1s皿ot　necessarily　crucial　in　the　fonowing　dlscuss1伽，but　the
正註ct　that　consu皿1er　credit　and　cred三t　cards　have　been　considered　as　a　powerful　means
of　sales　promotio口can　be　one　of　the　mdirect　evidence　supportive　for　that　assu血ption一
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solution　for　this　dynainic　maxi㎜ization　prob1em　gives　an　optimal　use　of
．credit　card　as　a　function　of　credi・t　card　interest　rate　and　rate　o」f　return
from　an　investment．But，this　original　optima1p1an　wi1l　not　incur　a
possibi1ity　of　future　financiaユtroubles　by　credit　card　use　during　the
p1aming　period（which　is　actuany　infinite　in　Brito＆Hartley（1995）），
since　the　no－inso1vency　condition　is　imposed　from　the　outset．This　is
what　we㎜ean　by　saying　that　the　origina1optimal　p1an　wil1not　incur　a
seriou」s　financial　troubles　in　the　future　caused　by　the　credit　use
original1y　planned　during　the　period．
　　　　Our　story　begins　here．Suppose　Tis　a　maximum　repayment　period
for　typica1consumer　credit　users（for　examp1e，credit　card　users），that
is，the　amount　of　avai1ab1e　or　al1owance　time　before　they　re．pay　th」eir
debts，T　a1so　could　be　thought　of　as　average　term（short　or　long　term）
a1lowed　to　repay　consu㎜」er　credit　debts－For　examp1e，an　introduction
of　revolving　credit　accounts　cou1d　be　interpreted　as　a1onger　T　in　our
皿odeL　Moreover，T　could　be　the　same　as　a　p1anning　period　for
consmer　credit　users，We　assume　that　this　is　the　case　and　that　each
credit　user　has　his　optima1consumption（or　life）p1an　which　is　based　on
his1onger＿term　original　opti・ma1consumption（or1ife）plan，but　tailored
to　adjust　to　the　particu1ar　p1anning　Period　T．
　　　　As　HL　model　implies，we　assume　that　a　typical　consumer　knows
that，as　periods　proceed，he　wi1l　fee1an　i㎜pulse　to　buy　that　wi11b℃
associated」with　reference　pcint　shift　triggered　by　some　u，nexpected
physica1，cr　teI11porary，or　even　social　proximity．　For　si㎜p1icity，we
assuエne　here　th」at　he　fee1s　an　impu1se　to　buy　one　unit　of　the　same　goods
（nor・ma1ized　to，say」＄1，for　examp1e）once　per　period，and　that，o・nce　he
decides　to　buy，he　carries　out　these　impu1se　purchases　exclus工vely」on
credit，that　is，using　credit　cards，　Here，credit　cards　sta．nd　for　genera1
availability　of　instant　co皿su皿er　credit，7　Thus，in　our　model，even
7　　’B’riセ⑪＆Haruey（1995）def卿」ed　tw」⑪　functions　of　credit　cards；0瓜e　as　a　庁ansacti⑪口
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though　a　consumer　knows　that　his　impulse　buying　may　violate　lユis
origina1optimal　consumption　p1an，he血ay　carry　out　the　impulse
buying　behavior．Any　credit　use　over　and　ab0Ye　the　origina1ly　p皿anned
use　ca皿1〕e　considered　as　an　excessive　credit　use　which　means　unp1am－
ed　increase　in　debts　and　this　origina1Iy　unplanned　credit　use　is
capモured　by　impu1se　buying　behaviors　on　credit　which　are　triggered　by
essentia11y　unexpected　arousal　of　some　proximity　during　everyday1ife、
3．2　」U’ti正蚊Flm柑on　of　Impu1se　Buガng・
　　　　AppIying　HL　mode1，we　can　write　a　consumer’s　uti1ity　fmc亡ion　of
impulse　purchases　as　fcnows．Let　l　denote　a　degree　of　loss　aversion
which　corresponds　toβ一αin　Section2，∫a　degree　of　reference　point
shift（norma1ized　to　Oくs〈1）．Then，1∫means　utiIity　from　one　impu1se
purchase，or　per　period．Letκbe　the　number　of　consecutive　impu1se
purchases　during　the　planning　Period　T，so　that　the　utility　function　as
a　function　of　the　number　of　impulse　purchases　wiH　be　the　fouowing：
σ（免）＝1∫（κ）、 （！）
　　　　To　simp1ify　our　analysis，we　assume　now　O＜∫く’1and　that　a1l　ofガ
are　carried　out　using　credit　cards、　］≡Iere，北stands　for　the　number　of
periods　as　well　as　the　number　of　consecutive　impulse　purchases，since
we　assume　one　impu1se　purchase　per　period．8
de▽ice　and　seco皿d　as　an　a1ternauve　to　bank　loan．They加ake　their　assumption　of　no
駆ace　period　for　credit　cards　which　biases　their　analysis　against　the1ユse　of　credit
c呂rds　as　a　transaction　device．ln　this　paper，we　simply盆ss1』me　that　the　main　function
of　credit　cards　is　a　means　of　impulse　or　immeidate　purchases　whether　they　serve　as　a
　transaction　deTice　or　an　a1ternatiΨe　to　bank　Ioans．
8　Since　we　can　use　the　us1ユal　concave　llti1ity　function　in　stead　of　the　linear　iunction，
th曹1inear　uti工ity　hnctio皿is　not　a　restrictive　assumption．The　cmcial　characteristics
　○土this　utility　function　are　the　exist£nce　of　reference　p011］t　to　evaluate　alter皿ative
　o1〕jects　and　t1］e　possibllity　of　its　shift、
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3．3　’Uti1i吋Cost　Fu皿6ti士n　of　I叩P阯se　Bu苅n9
　　　　The　consumers’ambivaユent　attitudes　toward　the　avai1ability　of
instant　consu皿er　credit　iIldicate　some　worry　or　fear　of　their　own
tendency　to　use　excess　credit　wbich　may　cause　financial　troub工es　in　the
future．We　wil1incorporate　this　aspect　into　our　mode1and　po§tulate
that　this　worry　or　fear　imposes　some　uti1ity　cost　on　credit　users　and
that　this　utility　cost　co皿es1〕asical1y∫rom　the　fact　that　consumers　do
violate　their　own　ori，gina1opti皿a1consumption　plan　by　their　i．mpu1se
buyi㎎behaviors，not　by　any　changes　in　extemal　conditions．We
・・p・・s・thi・・tility・ost・s・fu・・tionof其，s・・h・・C（”）i・it・・imp1e
versi㎝、　We　assume　the　usual　features　of　cost　function，that　is，
0’（名）＞0，0”（π）＞0－Sincethe・tility・ostfu・ction・・r・esacr・・i・1・o1e
in　our　mode1，we　w」i1l　discuss　in　Section4the　characteristics　of　tbis
c◎stfunctionandso．meofitspossiblerefine皿ents（thatis，int・oductio・
of　individual　be1ief　and　cognitive　dissonance）in　more　detai1，
3．4　Mωel　Se廿in，g（2）
　　　　So　far，we　bave　assumed　that　a　typica1consu皿er　standing　at　the
initia1period　（say，工＝0）　of　the　p1am；1i叫9　horizon　τ，already　has　the
Qriginal　optima1consumption　pian　associated　witb　m　reference　pcint
shift，We　have　a1so　assu．med　that　he　anticipates　havi㎎an　i瓜一pulse　to
m」ake　an　unpla皿ned　purc．hase　once　per　period．　If　he　carries　o1ユt　the
i皿pu1se　by　buying　on　credit（by　using　credit　cards），he　wi11get　all
extra　utility　show皿by（！），　But，at　the§ame　ti．m£，he　i皿curs　e対ra
1ユtility　cost（worry　or　fear　Qf　Yio1地ng　by　himseli　his　own　origi二qal
opti皿a1pla皿and　faciug　fiエ1a皿cial　troubles　in　the　future）shown　as　C（劣）。
Therefore，he・wiIl　f乞ce　t血」e　fol1owing　Inax」i工皿i2ation　prob工e’m一：
　　　　　　吻叫）■C㎏），　　　　　　　　（2）
　　　　　　鋤妙舳oO≦匁・≦」’ア；
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　　　　The　solution（π．）for　this　prob1em気ves　the　optimal　number　of
consecutive　impulse　purchases　during　the　planning　period　T，Under
scme　reasonable　conditions　on　the　utility　and　cost　functions　specified
1ater，we　can　show　that　this　maxim．ization　problem」will　haye　a　mea－
ningful（or，interior）solution．Although匁should　be　discrete，here　we
treat五as　ifκis　continuous，g
　　　　Aエ1increase　in　the　optimal　sOIutiOn（ノ）柳iIl　imPly　an　inc「ease　in
possibi1ity　of　facing〕コmore　severe　financia1troub1es（inc1uding　Persona1
bankruptcy）in　the　future．　Therefore，an　increase　in　（κ‘）can　be
interpreted　as　a　proxy　for　an　increase　in　the　number　of　persons　who
suffer　serious　fin…mcia1prob1ems，or　personal　bankruptcies．If　this　is
the　case，and　reducing　persona1bankmptcies　is　one　of　the　important
current　sccio－economic　policy　objectives，we　can　discuss　the　effective＿
ness　of　some　po1icy　measures　in　terms　of　reducing（〆）within　our
modeL　We　will　discuss　some　poiicy　issues　related　to　persona1bank－
ruptcy　later　in　this　paper．ユo
4Sp㏄i旋atioms　of　Utility　Cost　Func廿on
　　　　Jn　our　model，一ike　the　uti1ity　function，the　uti1ity　cost　function　is
not　the　standard　one，although　preserving　some　of　the　common　charac－
teristics－We　assme　the　existence　of　some　uti1ity　cost　associated　with
tinle－inconsistent　behavior（impulse　buying　behavior　in　this　case），
which　is　imp1ied　by　consumers’prevaiiing　ambiva1ent　fee1ings　regard－
ing　consumer　credit．In　this　section，we　wi11discuss　the　nature　of　this
9　We　assu］〕le　tllat㎞is　modifioation　is　just　for　analytical　simplificat≡on　and　wiH
　create　no　diff三cu工t　prob1ems．
10In　this　paper肯we　take　this　oject1Ye　for卿nted．We　e五clude　personal　bankruptcy
　c巨used　m盆in1y1〕y　private　b1〕siness　or　invest血e口t　f洲ures　from　our　discl』ssion，Our
　main　concern　1s　the　personaI　bankruptcy　caused　by　excessive　credlt　1ユse　on
　㏄nsumption　goods　and　services一
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uti1ity　cost　function一
4I1Expe6ted　Uh1ity　Loss　of　Time　Imonsi；㎏mt　Behavior
　　　　A　basic　idea　of　this　utiuty　cost　fmction　is　as　fo11ows－When　a
typical　consumer皿akes　an　origina11y　unp1anned　impulsive　purchase，he
understands　that　his　original　optimal　consumption（or　in皿uch　broader
sense，his　desirab1e1ife）plan　wil1be　violated　to　some　extent，depending
on　the　degree　of　his　impulse　buying　behavior－This　violation　imp1ies
that　he1oses，as　a　kind　of　cost，some　portion　of　the　uti1ity　he　woul（l
have　received　when　he　carried　through　his　origina1optima1plan．We
wi1l　denote　the　utility　of　executing　and　completing　his　ori貞nal　optima1
consumption　plan　during　the　planning　Period　T　as冶一
　　　　We　also　assume　that　he　has　his　own　subjective（average）probabi1二
ity⑫）of　facing　financ三al　troubles　in　the　future　caused　by　one　impulse
purchase．So，one　impu1se　purchase　win　incurクprobability　cf　facing
financial　troubles　like　debt　repayment　after　the　end　of　the　p1anning
period．If　he　doesκtimes　of　consecutive　impulse　purchases，then　the
probability　becomesμand　the　expected　loss　in　the　utility　of　the
ori釦1／al　plan　comp1etion　can　be　shown　as紗π一The　average　probability
ク（that　is，per　one　impu1se　purchase）may　be　a　function　of　a　consumer’s
borrowing　rate　of　interest，his　net　wealth　and　disposab1e　income　which
represent　his　financia工ability　to　rePay　his　past　consumer　credit　debts．
Here，we　simply　assume　that力is　a　c◎nstant　during　T　periods肯！且
4．2　Time　Pressure　Fa6伽r
　　　　’Moreover，we　postulate　i皿this　paPer　that　a　consu・mer’s　worry（or，
fear）about　suffering　financia／distress　in　the　future　after　period　T　is
1！　Esti孤一ating　the　subjectiYe　probabiliちyク，皿負y　suffer　human　c⑪gnitive　11m・itatiOns
　1ike　incomp－ete　heuristics，e測essive　se1王＿confidence　etc山　劃nd　be　biased　toward
　u皿deresti－nati⑪n，　See　Jackson（ユ985），f⑪r　examp／e一
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not　just　a　si1皿pie　probability　of力呪，but　inversely　proPortional　to　the
a肌ount　of　avai1ab1e　or　a11owance　ti皿e　before　he　has　to　repay　his　debts
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ユ（thatエs、ユ十丁一劣）　Therefore，the　term　　　　　　　　1s　mterpreted　as　a
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1＋T一κ）
tim・p・…u・・（・r，ap・ob・biiitydi・・㎝・ti・g）f・・to・forμ，t・ki㎎
account　of　a∀ai1abIe　time　or　tiine　pressure．
　　　　This　ter」m　implies　that，wben　there　is　ample　allowance　h加．e　before
repaymen亡of　consumer　debts，a　consumer　hardly　feels　anxious　or
worried　about　facing　financial　troub1es　in　the　future箏b1ユt　as　the
a11owance　time　before　repay皿ent　becomes　scarce（that　is，as　time
P・…m・i・亡…ifi・・），hi・f・…ff・t…fi・…i山mb1・・・・…dby
i」mpu1se　purchases　on　credit　wil1drasticaliy　and　disprcportionately
intensify－　In　other　words，consumers　might　perceive　the　same　prob－
ability　p　differentIy，depending　on　how　much　ti皿e　they　have　avai1ab1e
beforethef・turefi・a・cialt・・ubles㎜ighthapPen，a・dtendtom－
derestimate　it　when　there　is　amp1e　a11owance　time　before　debt　repay－
ment．This　is　the　reason　why　a　consumer　may　carry　out　his　impu1se
buying　beha∀ior，even　if　he　knows　that　the　impu1se　behavior　n1ay
jeopardize　his　origina1optimal　plan，We　wi1工define　this　subjective　fear
of　facing　financia1troubles　in　the　future　associated　withガand　a　time
・・・・・…f・・t・…1イ（、十÷一五）／1・
　　　　Based　on　the　above　discussions，we　now　have　a　si㎜p1e　version　of
the　uti肚y　cost　function　of　i血pulse　purchasesエin　the　following　form
・（1）一舳）一伽／（ユ十÷一、）／ （3）
ユ2　0ur血odelエnay　l〕e　interpreted　as盆n　attempt　to　expla1血hum棚decison　maki血g　by
　app］ying“SaIience　e行ect｝in　im血ed1ate　and　cerぬin　benef三ts　versus　re血ote　and
　1］nc直rtain　costs・　　The　first　apPilcation　of　“SaIience皿　i皿　cognitive　psychology　to
　eoo皿omics　is　in　Akerlof（1991）、
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　　　　Here，后represents　the　utility　Qf　executing狐d　completing　the
origipal　opti皿al　p1狐a口d　P（丁皐劣）represents　a　degree　of　worry　or　fear
（・・p・・…d…　di・・…t・d・・bj・・ti・・pmb包bility）・ff・t…｝i・狐・i・l
troub1es　caused　by　impu1se　p平rchases，so　that　0（κ）　（that　is，
伽／（1、÷、勾／i㎜・1i・・・・…i…1・…ti・・1・1狐・・肌・／・此・
・ti1iζylo・tbyf・arb・…ftb・・onsec・tivei皿p・ls・Pu・・ha…（勾．ユ3
4．3　Individua1Belief　and　C¢gnitive　Disso皿ame
　　　　The　other　important　ar馴ment　in　the　cost　function　is　an　in＿
dividua1’s　be1ief　about　accept盆ble皿u皿ユber　cf　impulse　Purchases　duri口9
T，that　is，the　nu，mber　of　i工npu1se　purchases　that　he　belieYe§reasonable
or　all◎wable，Let　it　bり．We　assu．me　that　s◎lo㎎as　his4is　greater
13　If　we　in㎏rprete　this　ti．me　pressure　faotor乱s盆t1皿e　discou皿ti皿g　f鐵ctor　associated
　with　a　re・ward為，then　t1／is　ls　the　sa瓜e　fu皿ct：onal　form　as　one　versio皿o土the§o－ca1ユed
　’㎜atc肚ng工aw　grigi、肌ated　by　Herrnsteil〕一Fr固二凪k（！988）writes乳b◎ut　t血e瓜atchiコユg　law
　　as　fbuow・s＝
　　　IIQ口e　of　the　matc則口91aw」’s　PrgPertiesヱs　th誠tlユe　attr乱ct収eness　of貝rew」ard　is
i皿ver§ely　p㈹por直⑪エlal　to　its　delay　一口曲is　oo触ext，’‘de1ay”仰eans　the　amou皿t　of饒me
tl〕at　wi11e1apse　bef⑪re　t；be　rewa」＝d工s　received，　The　matchiエ■g　law－impIies　that　heavy
disco叩ti㎎gfdis釦〕ぬrerew弧d，a皿d貝㏄9池鵬arp伽acytothose触toccur
i止㎜」mediate1y，（p，78）．咀
　　　This　type　cf　hyperbo工ic　dユscou皿ti皿9　fu口cぜon　is　pr⑪ved　t⑪　induce　dIscou凪t
r㈱r渕1phe卿卿ena（w・hich1eadtotme・i皿co蝸istentb曲・Yigrs）i皿cq口t・astto‡he
usua1e軍p⑪鵬n胴discgu皿t土u9土帆ti㎝w」hicbi卿pliesal’榊ysti鵬一e⑪皿s1§t鋤tbe－
ha・iPrs，SeeA」i口・lie＆賦1乱皿（1992a，b），Elster（上螂）。A肚ougbtblsti眠pr棚u爬
factolr　as　a　prdbabi工ity　di§c⑪Un・箇ng　can　be　i皿terpreted士h：s　way，we珊1／1npt　take　this
W・ay，butS晦kt9⑪uroW皿i・teTpr晦的u鯛a如eP卿・峨faC蚊i口曲ispaP・er，
b郎郷Se　w・e　t上1mk　that　this　interpretatエo皿fエt§better　ipto　our　mode1settlng－　T」h起
i．卿p⑪r蜘鵬⑪ft虹epre§surei＾m孤畑isionproc豊s虜wa§鵬口tlo鵬d虹Tod豆
（！992）一
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than　his　be1ief○），he　feels　extra　utility　cost　from　the　possibi－ity　of
much　deeper　financia1troubles　s11ch　as　personal　bankruptcy　for　the
discrepancy　range　ofガーツ．We　denote　this　extra　uti1ity　cost四．We
a1so　assume　that　the　sam．e　form　as（3）appIies　to　this　part　of　utility
…t，…t1・・ψ（り）／（1＋、｛（五．ツ）））…i・・i・・…t・・・・…一
n．e」口ts　ofα1ater岩
　　　　The　individual　beliefω柳orks　in　tw〇一〇pposite」ways；cne　in
reducing’utility　cost，and　the　other　i」n　increasing　it．　On　the　one　hand，
increasing　his　belief　G）wil1lower　the　uti1三ty　cost　from　severe　financial
proble蘭s　because　the　discrepancy　between　his　deed　and　belief（κ一ツ）
gets　sma11er，On　the　other　hand，an　increase　inツitse1f　sti11incurs　the
utihty　cost　of　vio1ating　the　ori貞na1optima1plan　w’hich　is　an　increasing
function　ofツ（see（3））．　Considering　a11the　e1ements　mentioned　abo∀e，
we　now　re」write　C’（エ）as　a　function　of丑andツusing　the　same　form　as
（3），
・（り）一ψ（〔）（（1＋、呈（力一カ））・物（く1＋ケ、ツ）／・ （4）
sc1ong　asガis　greater　than　or　equal　to夕、Whenエ」＝’ツ，the　utility　cost
function　turns　back　to（3）、
　　　　The1ast　discussion　in．this　subsection　is　about　the　contents　of
1ユti1ity　costα、　Here　we　postulate　that　the　utility　costαhas　three
components　which　add　up　toα，such　asα＝・あ十〇十尾．We　have　a1ready
discussed　the　meaning　ofゑ　The　impulse　purchases（力）greater　than　a
consumerls　own　be1ief　about　acceptable　nun1ber　of　impu1se　purchases
O）impose　a　fear　of　deeper　financia－troub1es　in　the　future1ike　persona1
bankruptcy1We　denote　this　much　deeper　or　severe　financia1tro」ubles
as　persona1bankruptcy　hereafter，
　　　　The　eIement　ofあreflects　utility　cost　associated　exc1usive1y　with
economic　cost　and（possible）benef｛t　of　personal　bankruptcy，　As　the
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standard　economic　model　of　persona1bankruptcy　referred　to　in　the
Introduction　or　some　other　papers　（for　examp1e，Shepard　（1984））
implies，this　cost　might　be　negative　so　that　personal　bankruptcy皿ight
result　in　net　economic　benefits　bringing　a　positive　utility．
　　　　The　next　e1ement（む）mainly　represents　a　psycholo釦cal　or　moral
aspect　of　uti1ity　cost　of　perso竈al　bankruptcy．NaIne1y，c　reflects　utility
cost　such　as　socia1or　mora1pressure　caused　by　sociaI　stig㎜a　associ－
ated　with　the　personal　bankmptcy，or　regret，shame　or　guilt　in　terms　of
personal　as　well　as　socia1Inora1ity，resuIting　from　bankruptcy　for
which　a　consumer’s　own　excessive　impu1se　buying　behavior　is　respon－
sib1e．　Therefore，this　part　Qf　the　utility　cost　is　deeply　re1ated　to
personal　and　socia1morality（or，norms）．Based　on　some　robust　results
from　the　discipline　of　social　psychology，we　postu1ate　that　c　captures
the　utility　cost　from　a　discrep童ncy　between　his　deed（κ）and　individu創一
be1ief　O），ca11ed　cognitive　dissonance　a1＝1d　that　the　cognitive　dissona二nce
in」curs　an　urge　of　se1f－justゴfication　or　se1f－rationalization　to　reconci1e
this　discrepancy　in　the　way　to　change　his　be1ief．14
　　　　An　increase　in　c　incurs　higher　leve1of　cognitive　dissonance　given
a　discrepancy　between　his　deed　and　belief　and　gives　the　consumer　a
stronger　urge　to　reduce　the　dissonance　by　trying　to　self－justify　his　ow・n
deed，that　is，by　inducing　him　to　increase　his　own　individua1belief　G）．
One　way　to　incorporate　this　cost　aspect　of　co即itive　dissonance　i・n」to
our　mode1is　to　assume　that　the　ut．i1ity　of　executing　and　completing　an
original　optima1p1an（為）is　negatively　re1ated　toζ，in　thesense　that　an
increase（decrease）in6induces　a　ccnsumer　to　va1ue后1ess（lmre）tha皿
otherwise，In　our　mod」e1，this　re1ation　can　be　captured　by　assuming　a
！4　Co．駅」itive　dissonance　was　first　introduced　into　ec⑪口⑪m」1cs　by　Akerlof＆Dic，k」剛s
　（！982）、　Rece皿tly，Dickens（1986）discussed　i峰role　in　crime　prevention害　．R」abin
　（ユ994・）ana1y2ed　so．me　iofIuences　of　soci包1belieis　o皿individual（immorai）behaviors与
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　存
new　尾（だ）as　后’＝一、　」No卯，だ　m．eans　the　ori戴nal　optima王pian
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　6
comp1etion　uti肚y，動venσ15
F｛nany，we　can　write　our　uti1ity　cost　functio羽a§fonow’s：
・（由ルー力／（1＋、三（、．ツ））／・物／（1、÷、少） （5）
5　Maximiz棚on」P土oblem　and　Some　Com脾ratiw　S仇揃．cs
5．1M狐imiz批on　Pmb1em　and　Optimal　So1uti①ns
　　　　Now’箏based　on　our　preyious　d三scussions　about　the　uti1ity　and　co§t
f㎜・ti㎝・of㎞pu1・・p・rch・…（ti血・一i・・…ist・・tb・ha・io・・），w・c㎝
set　up　the　fo1low’in9血狐iInization　proble血that　a　consumer　win　face：
15　This　speciilcatiori加ay　be　too　specific．There　can　be　ma皿y　ways　through　wlユich
　〔ognitive　dissonance　would　exert　its　effects－Here　is　a正1example　of　how　cogniti舵
　d貴ssonance　works．（extracts　from　Wode＆Travis（1993），p，349．）
　　　“For　examp1e，clgarette　smoki血g　is　disson加t　with　the　awareness㎞aピs」血．oking
○舳ses　inness．｝　」The　smoker血ight　change　the　behavior　and　try　to　q血iし　」Oでshe
血ight　reject　the　cognition“smoking　is　bad、｝She　could　persuade　herself　thatξh亀win
quit　later　on（也after　these　exaエns”）．She　could　emphasize　the　be皿efits　oi　smok三ng（＾A
むigarette　helps皿e　relax、｝）0rshe　cou1d　dec王deshedoesn’twanta　lo血glife．anyhow、
（It柵’il1be　shorter，but　sw艶ter、つ　工n　all　Of　these　cases，出e　smOker　is　mot仰ated　to
reduce　dissona皿ce　because　the1〕ehavior，s皿ioking，is　out　of　kilter　with一㎞e　smoker寸s
know工edg定of亡he　dangers　of　that　behavior。”
　　　Therefore，the　ciユrゴ色nt　for五皿alizatio血of　cognitive　disso皿ance　in　ouf．Inodel　is　one
○土the　many　possible」ways　through　whlch　se］f→ustiflcatio皿」wo口〕d　w’ork　　For
脳窩mple，ther芭might　be加oth航way　where6call　l〕e　asociated　w三七h　the　de血omimtor
of　probabi1ity　discolmtmg　factor　oi　the　individual　beiiei　ter皿i血the　lユtl1ity　cost
f皿血ction，imp1ying　a1：eviatio血of　worry　or　fear　c汕sed　by　time　pressure一
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舳11一ψ（り）／（ユ、、｛（工．ツ）））一物／（1＋シ．ツ））（・）
∫．tOくツ〈π〈T．
　　　　Here，we　assume　the　situation　against　impulse　buying，that　is，1∫
＜枇二where　the　uti1ity　per　impu1se　buying（18）is1ess　than　the　expected
utiIity　loss⑫后’）．　Our　model　shows　that　even　under　this　unfavorable
case　for　impu1se　buying，the　ti㎜e　pressure　factor　introduced　in　our
modeI　imp1ies　that　people　may　stm　carry　out　impulse　buying．
　　　　We　can　solve　this　problem　and　the　optima1κ．andダas　shown
be1ow＝
ヅー1・・一（妙（ゼザ
・一1…ダー／妙（Pγ2
（7a）
（7b）
　　　　The　second　order　condition　can　be　pro▽ed　to　be　satisfiedI　For
meaningfu1so1utions（tha亡is，T＞グ＞ヅ＞O），the　fo11owing　conditions
have　to　be　satisfied；
ψ＜18（1＋τ），
18＜ク（捌1／2．
（8a）
（8b）
From　the　assumptions垂∫＜枇’and后’＜α，（8b）is　satisfied，And　in　the
fo11owing　discussions，we　will　consider　the　case　where　T　is　greater
　　　　　（幼一1∫）
than　　　　　，whlch1s　pos1tlve，so　that（8a）1s　satlsfled
　　　　　　　k
5．2Comp酊ative　S」組ti6s
　　　　Using　the　opti．㎜」a1intericr　solution§ofダandダ
deri’ve　sol〕1e　resu1ts　of　co工n・Para亡iYe　statics　as　follows。
（7a，b），we　can
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1土Effects　of　l　or8
　　　　　　篭ζ一去／㌣T）γ2・α
　　　　　　芸一芸・去／咋η）’ノ2・・
　　　　That　is．an　increase　in　utility　of　impulse　buyin．g　by　either；or3
wi1l　increaseダand夕‘．．
2，Effects　ofク
話一一（㌻ηγ2・α
箒一話一去／功（景ηザ・・
　　　　S］〕1aIler　（a∀erage）Probability　of　future　financiaI　troub1es　caused
もy　one　impu1se　purchase　wil1lower　worry　or　fear　of　financial　troub1es
in　the　future，and　tends　to　increaseヅandグ、
3－Effects　ofτ
；芋一1一去／、、（筈、）ザ・α
；手一諾・1一古／工、（筈η）1／2・・
As1ong　as（8a）hoIds，an　increase　in　T　means　longer　anowance　periods
for　debt　payments　so　that　it　will　inerease　bothヅandガ、Preva1ence　of
longer－ter㎜consum．er　credit　can　be　thought　of　as　a」n　increase　in　T　and
will　have　the　san1e　effect　onダand〆一
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4．Effects　ofり
∂ヅ
∂ろ
祭
＝O，
一一去（ク（1㌘）1／2・・
　　　　An　increase　in　economic　cost　associated　with　persona1bankruptcy
（or　severe　financia1troubIes）wi11lower〆but　have　no　effect　onヅ．
5．Effects　of　o
　　　　　　望一去／幼ヅ／ユ／2・・，
；ξ一着芸一／圭／（・一だ）／ク（1まη／！ノ2・α
簑；一書一／土）（・一だ）（力（苧／’ノ2・・，
ゲ（刺1／2＜・一后’。
0工ん召γωεS召，
　　　　The　effect　ofσon〆’will　depend　on　theエe1ative　size　of后’with
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂グ
respect　toαand　c　The　relatlon，　　　＞O，1s　more　plaus1ble　smce后1s　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂c
usual1y　considered　to　be　substantia11y　larger　than6，　Whenσis
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂〆
extreme1y　large1n　comparlson　wlth后，　　＜0cou1d　be　posslb1e　Thls　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂c
is　the　case　w・here　social　stigma，shame　or　guilt　of　going　bankrupt　are　so
severe　that　people　are　extreme1y　sensitive　to　tbeir　own　miscond｛ct
（impu1se　purchases　in　this　case），rather　tha丘trying　to　carry　through
their　origina1cptima1plan（or　obj　ective），
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6．一Effects　of唐
書簑一去／カ（影ザ・α
芸一簑一／士X苧）ユノ2・・
　　　　A－higherva1uationofexecutingandco皿p1etinganoriginaloptima1
plan（that　is，hi会her后）wil1c1ear1y1o」wer　bothヅand〆、We　c加use
these　resu1ts　in　the　fonowing　poiicy　discussioIis　in　Section7．
6　Creait　Line　and　Mu1tip1e　C砒dho1ders
6．1　Determimaゼon　of　Cre砧t　Hne（2）
　　　　In　this　subsection，we　turn　our　attention　from　the　demand　side　to
the　supp1y　side　and　discuss　briefly　the　profit＿maximizing　behavior　of　a
credit　company　under　the　simp1e　assumption　of　perfect　competition、ユ6
　　　　Under　the　usua1assumption　of　e．xpected　profit　maximization，we
siエnp1y　assume　here　that　a　typica1credit　company　wi1l　examine　qua1ifi－
cat｛ons　oi　each　applicant，estimate　his　riskiness　and　determine　a
㎜axim．uni　credit　extended　for　the　applicant　which　iInplies　his　m狐imum
num．ber　of　impu1se　purchases（2）during　T’in　our　mode1where　we
assume　that　the　amount　at　each　impulse　purchase　per　period　by　using
cr’edit　cards　is　the　saIne．
　　　　Consider　a　typical　credit　company　which　tries　to　determine（ex＿
pected）profitエnaximizing　credit1imit　to　each　applicant．The　creditor　is
16　There　has　been　a　d1scussl〇一n　on　w’hether　the　consumer　credlt㎜arket　is　re盆11y
　competitive　or血ot，　Ausul〕e1（1991）contended　that　theむonsumer　credit　is　not
　perfectly　co血petitive，based　on　the　observation　of　high　and　inf■exible　cred三t　rates－
　Recently珀Brito＆Hartley（1995）cr1tici2ed　Ausube1’s　argument　by　showmg　thaモthe
　observation　of　h1gh盆nd　in卸exible　credit　rates　can　be　oompatible　with　the　oo血peti＿
　tive　market占Se直also，C盆1em（1992）一
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supPosed　to　obtain　his　funds　in　a　perfect　capital　market，at　a　constant
interest　rate4，with∫＝1＋｛，with　no　other　extra　costs．17　Denote　the
credit　line2，and　a　credit　interest　rateれwith灰：1＋κandγ＞1．The
creditor　wi11examine　riskiness　of　each　applicant　and　estimate　a　defau1t
probabi1ity（Q）as　an　increasing　function　of班（the　amomt　with
interest　added）．Here，we　assume　that　this　default　fmction　has　a　very
simp1e1inear　form　of2R，that　is，Q＝侭R　for　a　reasonab1e　range　of　zR，
with口＞O　being　constant．Let　lbe　a　rate　of　co1lection　when　the　loan　is
in　default，（i，e一，％of　the　amount1ent　that　is　co11ected）I　Then，the
expected　profit　for　the　creditor　is：
π＝荻（1一娯）十（功・R）一2五 （10）
Under　the　perfect　competition，π＝0，so　that　the　optimal　credit　line2，is：
　　　　　（ト乃
2＝　　　批（亙一力
（1ユ）
Assuming　that灰is　exogenous　to　an　individual　creditor，this　determines
20f　indi▽idual　creditors　as　a　function　of　q，五∫and灰．　That　is，2is
increasing　as　R　and∫increase，and　as∫and　q　decrease．
　　　　More　strict　app1ication　of　bankruptcy1aw　may　be　captured　as　an
increase　inグ（for　example，wage　garnishments　and　an　increase　in
b・・k・・pt・y舳・gsmd・・th・・h・pt・・13）・・dp…ibly・d・・・・…i叫
This　imp1ies　that　more（less）strict　app1ication　of　the　bankruptcy1aw
！7We皿ote　that　this　assmption　of聰o　extra　coぬother　than工u皿d　cost　was皿ade　just
　for　analytical　simPlicity，　It　is　obvious　that　there　should　be　other　trarユsaction　costs，
　especiany　inform劃tio皿　processing　試nd　telec⑪．mm」u皿ic纈don　costs．　I皿　fact，many
　economists　i皿dicate比at　a　pr1．m盆ry　c汕se　fqr～m　upswing　in　the　the　n皿mber　of
　personal　bankruptcy　fi11n．9s　during　the1980’s　i皿the　US．A－is　a　substanbal　reduction
　i皿inforlIlati⑪n　costs　due　to　the　recent　tech口o1o劇」c纈11皿瓜ovatio皿in　te1ec⑪mInu〕i鯛tion
a皿dinfor㎜虹㎝processi㎎，iudditiontofinancia1der靱1ati9・si・thoseye・rs，
　See．Carrol］（ユ992），Johnson＆Staten（1994）一
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wil1raise（lower）the　credit1ine2by　inducing　creditors　to　be」more
（less）lenie皿t　in　granting　credit．This　is　one　of　the　justifications　for　the
right　of　discharge　of　debts　in　personal　bankruptcy　law　prcposed　by
Jackson（1985）．　He　c1aimed　that　the　righ｛of　discharge　with　persona1
bankruptcy　wil1impose伽uch　of　the　cost　burden　of　bankruptcy　on
cred1tors　and　give　an　strong　incentiヅe　for　the㎜to　examine　qualifica－
tio血s　of　credit　applicants　and　monitor　credit　users　more　rigorous1y
than　otherw’ise．We　will　dis㎝ss　this　aspect　i」n　Section7．
6，2　Ho1価ng　Se平e醐1Cmdit　Ca刮s
　　　　Nowadays，we　can　easily　observe　that　credit　companies　aggres＿
si▽eIy　co㎜pete　for　acquiring　ne」w　credit　card　users　and　are　wiHing　to
extend　credit　even　to　appIicants　who　already　have　severa1other　credit
．a．ds．So，eveni｛th・apPli…t！・κ“i・g・e・te・th・・・…ditli・e（・）by
one　credit　company，it　is　not　so　difficu1t　for　him　to　acquire　so㎜e　other
。。。dit。・・d・（1・t’…y仇diff・…t…d・）・…t…hi…κ｝（・・，〆：〃・）．
In　this　case，his　riskiness　imp1ied　by　his　tota1〆will　be　much　higher
than　his　riskiness　estimated　by　individua1creditors　so　that　creditors
wou1d　have　denied　any　credit　extension　to　him　if　they　had　known　in
advance1ike1ihood　of　his　total　credit　use（〆）from　his　credit　histor」y
through　some　kind　of　an　industry一一wide　credit　information　and　report－
i㎎network　system．18We　cal1this　pseudo－binding　case（〆＝倣）as
case1，There　is　a　rea1binding　case　where　a　consumer　can　not　obtain
credit　cards　enough　to　achieve　his〆（tbat　is，〆〉倣），which　will　be
case2，Tbe　other　case　is　where　his〆is　be1ow　his　credit1ine　posed　by
one　creditor．This　is　an　unbinding’case；we　ca11this　case3－
　　　　In　the　following　section，we　focus　on　an　important　prob1em　of　how
to　cope　with　a　secular　trend　of　increasing　Persona1bankruptcies　in　the
18　Thls　is　appIicable　especia11y　to　the　case　of　Jap盆n　where　the　industry－wide　credit
　壬nformation　a皿d　report　network　system　has　not　i1ユ11y　developed　yet一
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USA　and　discuss　a　policy　issue　of　whether　personal　bankruptcy　law
shou1d　be　app1ied　more　strict1y　or　not，in　addition　to　some　other　more
1ong－term　and　basic　policy皿easures　like　credit　education　and　in－
dustry－wide　credit　information　and　credit　reporting　network　system．
7Poli6y　Measures　md　Their　Eff㏄ti▽㎝ess　in　Our　Mode1
7．1　Effe6ts　of　Bankrup杭y　Law
　　　　We　can　use　some　resu1ts　of　comparative　statics　in　Section5to
discuss　possib1e　effects　of　more（or1ess）strict　application　of　persona1
bankruptcy1aw．　Staten（1993，p．4）points　out　that　there　are　at　least
four　different　types　of　costs　associated　with　perscnal　bankruptcy：a）
loss　of　non－exempt　assets（especia11y　for　Chapter7bankruptcy），b）
legal　fees　and　court　costs，　c）　restricted　access　to　credit　markets
fonowing　bankruptcy（e．g．、lower　probabi1ity　of　approval，higher　fi＿
nance　charges／fees，greater　co11ateral　requirements），and　d）socia1and
person」al　trauma／stigma　associated　with　persona1failure，　The　first
three　types　of　costs　capture　th」e　economic　costs　of　personal　ba．nkruptcy」，
represented　by　b　in　our　model．　The　fourth　cost　is　represented　by6
correspondingly．Therefore，more（less）strict　app1ication　of　the　bank＿
ruptcy1aw　implies　that　these　punishments　or　pena1ties　on　consumers，
financial　failure　will　be　mlch　heavier（1ighter）．First，we　wi11discuss
case（ユ），w」here茗is　pseudo－binding（〆＝概）．
（a）More　strict　application　of　the　bankruptcy　law
　　　　First，we　wi11ana1yze　its　possible　effects　on」the　d」e㎜and　side．
M：ore　strict　app1ication　raisesわwhich　wi11reduce　direct1y其㌧　Bu」t’in
th－e1ong－run」，this　will　also　tend　to　raise　c　by　increasi皿g　socia1or皿oral
stigma　of　bein．g1abeled　as　f虹ancial　failure，　This　in　turn　inte・nsifies
cognitiYe　disson卿ce　and　leads　to　higher　indiYidual　be1iefぴ）which
may　offset　the　direct　effects　ofむand6，an－d　eyentua11y　r，aiseダ，This　is
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂〆
the　case　where　　　　＞O　ho－ds　（see，Sectlon52）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂む
　　　　Next，we　wi11tum　to　the　supp－y　side，　More　strict　po1icy　wm
i…ease・on・・ti・n・ate・fdefau1t・dd・btsω・nd・maylowercreditor§’
perceiv’ed　probabi1ity’of　defau1t　by　decreasing　q，so　that　they　are1ikely
to　be　more1enient　in　screening　and　monitoring　apP1icants　and　to　raise
2．　Th．is　in　tum　i皿p1ies　that　credit　users　can　achieve　th．eir　now
i．口creased　〆　throug」h　an　increase　in　each　2　0r　obtaining　more　credit
cards，In　this　case，credit　co加panies　wil1a㏄ommodate　an　increase　in
ダ
（b）Less　strict　appIication　of　the　bankmptcy　law
　　　　This　case　win　be　just　the　opposite　to　the　more　strict　case
discussed　aboヅe　in（a）．As　for　its　effects　on　the　demand　side，it　lowers
b．As　a　result，〆will　inc“ease　in　the　short＿run．But　in　the1ong－run．
this　wil1also1ower　c，　Although　the　lower　c　itse1f　increases〆，it
increases尾’through　the　a1leYiation　of　cognitiYe　dissonance　andユowers
〆through　loweringヅ．　In　the1ong＿run，the　tota1effect　is1ike1y　to
1OWer〆I
　　　　As　for　its　effects　on　the　supp1y　side，it　wi11lower　co11ection　rate　of
defaulted　debtsωand　may　raise　creditors’perceived　probabi1ity　of
default　b’y　increasing　g－　Therefore，t」his　wi1l　lower　z　and　give　them
stronger　in．cen．tives　to　screen　and　monitor　credit　users．　As　we
1〕1entioned　ear1ier，this五ine　of　argm］□［ent　can　be　a　theoretica1exp1anation．
of　the　justification　that　Jackson（ユ985）made　for　defending　personal
bankruptcy　with　the　right　of　discharge．
　　　　Since　credit　companies　become　reluctant　to　issue　credit　cards，and
n1ore　strict　in　screening　qualifications　of　apPlicants，we　can　safe1y
assume　that　app1icants　can　not　get血ore　credit　cards　as　easi1y　as
before　and　that　n　is　rather　fixedI　This　scenario　implies　that伽’．has　t0
decrease，since〆＝倣．Therefore茗our　mode1predicts　as　for　the　case
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（1）that　more（less）strict　app1ication　of　persona－bankruptcy　law　wi11
・…t・・1lyi・…a・・（d・・…s・）b・th・．・・dヅ、
　　　　The　real　binding　case（2）where〆w，can　be　ana1yzed　similar1y　to
the　pseudo－binding　case（1）．　Since　the　actua1number　of　impu1se
purchases　is　bounded　and　equal　to倣，we　can　predict　as　before　that〆
andヅwil1eventually　increase（decrease）according　to　more（less）strict
application　of　persona1bankruptcy　law－　Finauy．we　wi11brieny
discuss　the　non－binding　case（3）where2＞〆holds．It　is　fair1y　obvious
that　the　ana1ysis　of　its　effects　on　both　demand　and　supp1y　sides　in　this
case　is　essentia11y　the　same　as　before　so　that　the　same　predictions　wiH
ho1d　in　this　case　too．
　　　　To　sum皿arize，our　model　imp1ies　that　more（1ess）strict　app1ication
of　the　bankruptcy　law　may　raise（1ower）グas　well　asヅin　the　longイun
through　affecting　both　of　demand　and　supply　sides　in　the　same
direction，EYen　if　the　effects　on　the　supply　side　are　weak，the　maiエi
conclusion　wm　remain　intact，The　standard　mode1is　concemed　mainly
or　even　exclusive1y　with　economic　net　benefits　from　persona1bank－
ruptcy，the　direct　effects　of　b　in　our　mode1－Our皿ode1shows　that　this
is　not　enough　and　may　lead　to　wrong　predicti01ユs。
7．2　Some　Other　Meas㎜res
　　　　There　are　som－e　other　important　measures　to　reduce　persona1
bankruptcies　in　the1ong－run　by　innuencing　consumers’uti1ity　and　cost
functions．　Although　there　are　many　papers　that　discuss　self＿contro1
aspect　of　curbing　time－iエiconsistent　behavior（Ains1ie＆Has1a．瓜（1992b），
E1ster（1984），Hoch＆Loewenstein（199！）、Shelling（ユ984．1992），Strot茗
（1956），Tha1er＆She正rin（ユ981）），we　wi11not　refer　to　general　discus－
sions　of　se1f＿contエol　prob1ems　in　this　paper，19　Here　we　wi11confine
our　discussions　of　curbing　ti．me－inconsistent　behaviors（impu1se　pur
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・hasesinthispaper）珊ithinourmodelandconside・p・ovidi㎎credit
education　to　consu」mers，and　industry－wide　credit　information　and
reporting’n．etwork　syste1皿、Here　are　so皿e　main　points　worth　noting：
（1）Credit　ed1ユcation20
　　　　Our　model　imp1ies　that1ower　l　or3，higher治and　smauer　T　wil1
decreaseπ．　Credit　education　can　be　effecti▽e　in　these　aspects，　It　ca正i
」pro∀ide　consu．mers　with　usefu1knowledge，such　as　good　and　bad　poi」nts
of　consu」mer　credit　or　credit　cards，awareness　of　peopIe’s　own　tendency
to　buy　i1npulsively，importance　of　making　and　executing　sound　con＿
sumption（or　even　life）p1ans　at　each1ife　stage　and　so　on．This　might
be　very　he1pful　for　consumers　to　se1f－manage　their　credit　use，　Our
model　also　points　out　that　as　far　as　u．tility　coefficients　of　cost　function
are　cbncerned，raising　尾is　the　most　effective　in　contro11ing　impu1se
buying　behavior，Therefore，a　credit　education　emphasizing　the　impor－
tan㏄of　mak三ng　and　e」xecuting　plans　wi11be　the　most　effective　in
preventing　the　excessive　use　of　consumer　credit．A1so，having　shorter
pIanning　Period　T，that　is，to　tailor　the　original　optimal　plan　to　shorter
sub－PIanning　Period　τis　a1so　effective，
（2）De▽e正opment　of　industry＿wide　credit　information　and　reporting
　　　network　syste血
　　　　This　wi11make　it　possible　to　check　each　consumer’s　overa11credit
use　so　that加ore　correct　and　strict　screel〕i－ng　and　monitoring　can　be
possibIe　and　that　the　credit　line　assessment　and　management　by　credit
19　This　does　not　mean　that　the　self－control　or　se1f＿management　aspect　is　Ilot
　i皿portant，but　just　the　opposit虐．　It　is　so1mportant　that　there　sllould　be　required
　another　indepe血dent　research　for　the　topic．
20　Cred】t　education　wm　include　activities　of　credit　counsenin．g　instltutlons　whose
　purposes　are　main］y　to　preve皿t　credit　abuse　or　careless　credit　u．se　planning，etc．
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companies　can　be㎜ore　effectiye，’This　will　reduceダif共㍉n　gepera1js
b⑪・unded，　This　infor孤ation　and　reporting　network　sy」stem　is　a1§o　usefu1
in　P」roviding・m」ore　accurate　an」d　adequate　information　to　credit　users　so
that　they　can　be皿ore　aware　of　their　credit　history　and　rePutation　and
be　工nore　careful　and　accurate　about　their　credit　use　planning，sucl〕　as
estimating　their　own　probabi1ity　p　more　correctly．21
8Summ蛆y　md　Con」c1usions
　　　　One　of　the　main　objectives　in　this　p．aper　was　to　set　up　a　non－
standard　皿ode1wh」ich　could　exP1ain　PeoPle’s　ambivalent　attitudes
toward　the　avai1abi1ity　of　instant　consumer　credit　which　many　consum－
er　surveys　revea1　al〕」d　yet　the　standard　econo卿ic　m」odel　could　not
exp1ain　satisfactorily，　As　far　as　we　know，this　paper　is　the　first
atte皿pt　to　explain　con，su卿」ers’prevaili・ng　am」biva1ent　feelings　toward
the　availabi1ity　of　c◎n－su肌er　credit　or　credit　cards　and　to　deal　with
personal　bankru．Ptcy　problenl　iP　an　apProach◎ther　than　the　stan，dard
modeL
　　　　W」e　have　assu卿ed　that　impu1se　buy」in，g　be．bavior　is　o．ne　of　the
f卿d」a卿e・nta1causes　cf　excessive　credit　use　w．hich皿ay　lea」d　to　perso．n」al
ba・nkruptcy　and　ProPosed　the　reference－Poiut－shift1node1to　ex－p1ai，n」th」e
utility　of　impu1se　buying，　W」e　ha・ve　a1so　prop◎sed　th」e　uti肚y　c◎st
functi〇二n　re．flecting　con－sumers｛worry　or　fear　of　excessive　credit　use，
which」incorporates　two　factors　of　time　pressure　and　co，g口itiYe　disson＿
auCe，
　　　　The　◎ther　、卿ain　object：ive　was　to　apP1y　this　皿1od」e1　to　’P◎1icy
d」isc・u」ssions　of　ho棚一to　coPe　双・三th　the　sec皿1ar　i口crease　in　Person．al
bankruptcy　in　the　USA，an」d」possibly」to　dra’w　so皿e’useful　preventive
皿easures　for　this　future　prob1el㎜」in」Japa口，O鵬皿ain」i肌plication　of比e
2ユTheneed⑪fdeve19P1皿9thi§ki皿d⑪fi加u§鮒一w工decr蝉ti口for卿独”etw⑪rk
　sys触isespeei汕yurge口ti皿」Jap狐一
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mode1is　that　less　strict　apP1ication　of　bankruptcy　law　may　be　1皿ore
effective　in　pre∀enting　financial　troub1es　（inc1uding　Personal　bank－
ruptcy）than　the　more　strict　application．　The皿ore　strict　application
may虫ve　rise　to　a　backfire　in　the1ong－run，　Strengthening　the　socia1
pressures　by　socia－stigma　of　being　bankmpts，or　tightening　moral
discip工ines　too　severe1y　may　make　peop1e　more　unreasonab1y　keen　or
sensitive　to　shame　or　guilt　to　their　own　misbehaviors　and　cause　a
backfire　in　the　future　through　cognitive　dissonance．
　　　　As　for　some　other1ong－term　prevention　po1icies，our　modei　i加plies
that　credit　education　focusing　on　raising　the　uti1ity　of　executing　and
comp1eti㎎モheo・igina1opti皿alconsumption（or，inamuchb・oade・
sense，desi・ab1elife）P1ansco・ldbethemosteffectivep・eve皿tion
policy．Emphasizing　a　positive　reward（后）rather　than（economic，socia1
or　Inoral）Punishments（わor　c）is　more　effective　in　preventing　excessive
impu1se　purchases，And，at1east　in　the　case　of　Japan，develoP皿ent　of
an　industry－wide　credit　information　and　reporting　network　system　will
be　necessary　and　effective　as　a　prevention　device．　It　wi．11be　beneficial
to　both　sides　of　creditors　and　credit　users　in　reducing　Personal
bankruptcies．
　　　　Fina1ly，during　our　policy　discussions，we　have　been　taking　it　for
granted　that　a　primary　concern　about　persona1bankruptcy　problen1s　is
to　reduce　persona1bankruptcies．We　wi1l　note　that　although　this
supposition　may　be　reasonable　and　acceptable　for　the　present，it　win
require　some　further　examination　to　estabIish　that　this　objective　is
rea11y　adequate．
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